Thursday, November 7, 2013

2011 Cyberattack on DuPont

James E. Gilbert
UMUC
March 30, 2013

Introduction
According to a 2011 white paper published by the computer security firm Symantec, security analysts identified an effective and well-coordinated cyber threat primarily directed against the American private sector (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011).  Codenamed "Nitro", the attack initially targeted human rights organizations and automotive manufacturers as early as April 2011.  Although 48 companies across a wide range of industries were affected, by July 2011 the focus of the cyberattack shifted solely to organizations in the chemical sector.  29 companies from this industry were affected with DuPont among the most heavily targeted (Prince, 2011).  As one of the world’s largest chemical manufacturers, DuPont holds lucrative patents including Teflon and Kevlar (DuPont, 2013).  It is this type of intellectual property that researchers believe was the intended target for industrial spies.  This incident is representative of a growing type of cyberattack commonly known as advanced persistent threats (APT). 

By their very nature, APTs are carried out by countries or organizations with the resources and knowledge to launch coordinated and prolonged cyberattacks on protected networks.  Groups that employ APTs generally target companies or government agencies seeking lucrative intellectual property or classified government information.  The motivations for the type of attack DuPont experienced range from financial to geopolitical and the threat actors have been known to use a variety of methods to gain entry into hardened networks.  To combat this growing danger, organizations must adopt a defense-in-depth methodology to cybersecurity that not only protects digital infrastructure but also discourages future attacks.

Threat Category
The first APT was seen as early as 1998, when analysts identified a series of cyberattacks against the Pentagon, NASA and the US Department of Energy.  It has only been in the last few years however that this innovative threat has been used with increasing frequency and effectiveness (Smiraus & Jasek, 2011).  Each part of the name “Advanced Persistent Threat” represents important characteristics of this threat category.  APTs are advanced in that they represent an innovative and adaptive cyberattack.  Actors employing this approach are well-versed in a variety of technical and non-technical exploitations to gain entry into a targeted network.  They use publicly available hacking tools or can utilize more sophisticated techniques depending on the level of network defenses.  APTs are persistent in that targets are carefully researched and the attack meticulously planned.  Actors using this approach often require prolonged access to their targets and have the capability to exploit a network for months or even years to obtain intended information.  Finally, APTs are carried out by a special category of hackers.  Individuals generally lack access to the technical and personnel resources necessary to carry out these attacks.  The majority of APTs identified are estimated to have been carried out by nation-states or criminal organizations (Scully, 2011).  Identified by Symantec during the "Nitro" hack, these characteristics are important pieces of information when determining likely attackers (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011). 

Likely Threat Actors
When analyzing what types of attackers could carry out a cybercrime, it is import to assess motivation and means.  While these factors will be discussed in later detail, it is important to note that all that is required for an APT “…is an aggressor with a motive and a few tens of thousands of dollars” (Scully, 2011, p. 200).  This means APTs are available options to corporate adversaries, organized crime groups and hacktivists alike.  Historically however, APTs are forms of attack believed to be carried out by nation-states.  Since 2010, there has been an increasing amount of evidence pointing to China as one of the most active users of this form of cyberwarfare. 

As early as 2006, McAfee began tracking a five-year long cyber campaign called Operation Shady.   The intrusion targeted over 70 public and private organizations throughout 14 nations (McDonald, 2011).  In a more recent example, the security encryption firm RSA was hacked in 2012.  Experts believe the culprits used the information they obtained to carry out additional attacks against the defense contractor Lockheed Martin.  Based on a growing database of techniques and motives, experts believe the culprit behind both attacks and the 2011 attack on the chemical sector to be hackers located in China (McDonald, 2011).

Motivation
Historically, APT attacks have targeted private industry trade secrets or classified government data.  Attacker’s motivations have included political activism, economic espionage, or traditional warfare (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011).  APTs are used in these cases, because this type of information is often stored within well-protected networks.  As a result, hackers seeking this data must resort to a prolonged and sophisticated approach to attack  targeted networks.  Over the last few years, hackers have penetrated the networks of defense contractors, computer chip manufacturers, and mining companies.  The type of information exfiltrated has ranged from blueprints to chemical formulas (Riley, 2012). 

As one of the world’s largest and oldest pioneers of industrial chemicals, DuPont invests a significant amount of revenue in research and design activities.  This is evident by the company’s product page which boasts over 1,400 new products and 2,000 filed patents (DuPont, 2013).  Over the last few years, government agencies and corporate security firms alike have signaled the warning that China has actively engaged in cyberwarfare for both industrial and traditional espionage purposes. The 2011 attack on DuPont and the chemical sector appears to follow this pattern with the attacker’s goal being “…intellectual property such as design documents, formulas, and manufacturing processes” (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011, p. 1).

Targeted Assets
Although the "Nitro" attack initially targeted human rights organizations and auto manufacturers, the majority of companies affected came from the chemical sector.  This included a number of Fortune 500 companies involved in the development of advanced materials for both corporate and military uses (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011).  The perpetrator behind the intrusions appeared to be after intellectual property from the various chemical companies.  Proprietary information from these companies represents a significant investment in both time and financial resources.  Illicitly obtaining this type of information provides nations or companies with the means to significantly enhance their own research and development activities at a fraction of the cost.  Based on their findings, Symantec’s researchers believe the purpose of the 2011 penetrations to be “industrial espionage, collecting intellectual property for competitive advantage” (McDonald, 2011).

Means of Attack
According to historical analysis, the most prevalent type of APT begins with a social engineering attack (Smiraus & Jasek, 2011).  Hackers used a similar two-pronged tactic against DuPont and other targeted organizations in 2011.  Specific emails were sent to recipients within each company claiming to be from known business associates while a more generalized email was sent to hundreds of random employees appearing to be a security update.  The emails were actually Trojans containing a self-extracting executable file named Poison Ivy.  Poison Ivy is a commonly available Remote Access Tool (RAT) developed by a Chinese national.  Once executed, the program provides an attacker with complete control over a target’s computer.  After installation, the Poison Ivy program contacted a command and control (C&C) server using TCP port 80.  Attackers used the program to gather information about the compromised system including the “infected computer’s IP address, the names of all other computers in the workgroup or domain, and dumps of Windows cached password hashes” (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011, p. 2).  With this information, hackers began exploring the network looking for domain administrator credentials in order to provide them access to computers storing the desired information.  The last part of the attack differed depending on the targeted system.  In most of the cases however, once the attackers gained access to the targeted information, it was copied to internal system archives.  The data was then uploaded to remote servers to finalize the exfiltration and complete the cyberattack.

Description of Attackers
The growing consensus throughout the cybersecurity community is that the Chinese government is one of the most active state sponsors of cyber espionage.  Conclusively proving this theory and identifying specific attackers however has been problematic.  In the DuPont hack, Symantec was actually able to trace the attacks back to a single individual.  This level of detail was obtained by tracking the original attack back to a virtual private server in the United States.  This in turn was connected to an individual known as Covert Grove, who was later identified as a Chinese male in his 20’s living in the Hebei region of China (Chien & O'Gorman, 2011).  Security experts have become increasingly successful at tracing attacks back to specific IP addresses; however proving who was actually behind the attack has been more elusive.  In the 2011 attack on DuPont, Symantec was unable to determine if Covert Grove acted alone or was employed by a third party.  Symantec theorized that the level of expertise needed to carry out the attack suggests Chinese government or military involvement.  This theory however has been difficult to prove.  China has both the largest population of internet users in the world, with some of the poorest security practices (McDonald, 2011).  Even when a hacker’s IP address can be traced backed to mainland China, the Chinese government has plausible deniability in the fact that computers are easily hijacked and IP addresses spoofed (Mandiant, 2013).

How to Discourage Future Incidents
Although the high-profile attack on various chemical companies in 2011 was newsworthy, it was not the first cyberattack targeting DuPont.  In fact, the chemical company was attacked by Chinese hackers twice between 2009 and 2010.  This information was kept secret by DuPont until a separate cyberattack by the hacktivist group Anonymous uncovered confidential emails about the incident and released them to the public (Riley & Forden, 2011).  Not only were these attacks kept secret from the public, but they were also held back from the company’s investors.  DuPont’s 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during this period failed to even mention cyberattacks as a significant risk to the company (Riley, 2012).  DuPont’s response to this incident has been the typical reaction from most publicly traded companies.  Many organizations believe that any disclosure of cyberattacks may equate to a damaged reputation or a drop in stock price.  Companies believe these negative consequences outweigh any potential benefit from sharing details of the attack and lessons learned with other organizations (Smiraus & Jasek, 2011).   

Compelling companies to be more forthcoming with details of attacks has been sporadic at best.  Federal laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996 require companies in certain industries to report cyberattacks (Scully, 2011).  Although these regulations require companies to report attacks, the SEC’s interpretation is that the amount of information required to be disclosed “…will depend on whether company lawyers determine the incidents had, or will have, a material effect on the enterprise” (Riley, 2012).  This leaves room for interpretation among companies and across industries.  Many in the cybersecurity community believe however, that disclosure and information exchange are among the most important tools in discouraging future cyberattacks.  This principle was further emphasized by President Obama in February 2013 when he signed a presidential directive outlining information sharing between the public and private sectors on matters of cybersecurity. The executive order takes an innovative approach in that it directs the Department of Homeland Security to share classified cybersecurity threat information with private organizations (Zetter, 2013).   The theory behind this approach is that with relevant threat detail, private companies will have the intelligence and perhaps motivation to better safeguard their digital infrastructure from impending attacks.

How to Defend Against Similar Threats
Information sharing is an important component in protecting against cyberattacks, but it must be used in conjunction with a robust security plan.  A common method  used to better understand what organizational risks exist is the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) framework.  This technique provides organizations with a tool to develop individual threat profiles based on critical assets and vulnerabilities (UMUC, 2013).  In the case of DuPont, security analysts using the OCTAVE technique would have been able to determine that intellectual property was a critical asset to the organization with foreign nations or competing companies interested in obtaining this information.  Employing the OCTAVE framework would also have shown the company's management that a large multinational organization with thousands of employees like DuPont has numerous vulnerabilities.  To defend against attacks similar to the 2011 "Nitro" penetration, DuPont must adopt a comprehensive security strategy that incorporates administrative, personnel and technical safeguards.

A recent assessment found that 128 Fortune 500 companies do not have policies in place protecting their intellectual property (Matthews, 2013).  This means that in over 25% of America's largest corporations, employees have no uniform policy guiding their daily decisions on how to handle some of their organization's most valuable assets.  As cyberattacks and corporate espionage continue to increase in frequency and sophistication, drafting comprehensive security and acceptable use policies should be the first step in creating a defense-in-depth cyber strategy.  Once a policy is in place, organizations should focus on a variety of human and technical safeguards.  Just as most APTs begin with a social engineering attack against individual workers, employees also represent the first line of defense against this threat.  All individuals in a company must be provided with up-to-date security training and awareness briefings on emerging cyber threats.  Finally, critical information assets should be afforded an extra layer of network protection.  Digital architectures should be created to segregate "trophy information" like trade secrets from normal activities within an organization (Scully, 2011).  This includes implementing separation-of-duty policies and safeguards as well as restricting use of unauthorized mobile devices and portable digital media.  In addition, IT administrators should ensure that operating systems and applications are routinely patched and regular system audits are conducted (Smiraus & Jasek, 2011).

Conclusion
APTs, like the one targeting DuPont in 2011, are sophisticated and carefully executed attacks carried out by determined adversaries.  The type of information attackers seek is so financially or strategically valuable, that nations or groups employing these tactics will stop at nothing to obtain it.  To defend against this threat, organizations must adopt defense-in-depth approaches incorporating hardware, software, personnel and policy safeguards.  This strategy should also include information sharing between public and private sectors.  Although APTs are a relatively new phenomenon, one of the most effective strategies in discouraging future incidents has been alerting the public to the tactics and techniques of successful cyberattacks.

References
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DuPont. (2013). Company at a glance. Retrieved from http://www2.dupont.com/Our_Company/en_CA/glance/

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Matthews, C. M. (2013). Many companies silent on IP protection as cyber threat emerges. The

McDonald, J. (2011). Cyber attacks on chemical companies traced to China. USA Today. Retrieved from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/story/20111101/China-hackers/51024936/1

Prince, B. (2011). Coordinated cyber attacks hit chemical and defense firms. Security Week.

Riley, M. (2012). SEC push may yield new disclosures of company cyber attacks. Bloomberg.

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Smiraus, M., & Jasek, R. (2011). Risks of advanced persistent threats and defense against them.
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University of Maryland University College (UMUC). (2013). Module 7: Psychological Aspects
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Zetter, K. (2013). Executive order aims to facilitate sharing of information on threats. Wired.




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